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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kristina Quintana pled guilty to one charge of grand theft, one charge of burglary,
and two counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property. The proceedings for the
charge of grand theft were held before a different judge at the district court level, but
both sentencing judges relied on the same presentence investigation report and
considered each other's sentences as they imposed each of Ms. Quintana's sentences.
As such, most of the issues on appeal are identical, and so the cases were consolidated
for purposes of appeal.
In the first case, for the lone grand theft charge, Ms. Quintana received a unified
sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed. In the second case, she received a
unified sentence of ten years, with four years fixed, for the burglary charge, and unified
sentences of fourteen years, with four years fixed for each of the grand theft by
possession of stolen property charges. The second grand theft by possession sentence
was made consecutive to the other two charges, which were concurrent. This resulted
in an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, in the second case,
which was made concurrent with the sentence from the first case.
Ms. Quintana alleges that her sentences represent an abuse of the district courts'
sentencing discretion.

In particular, she argues that the judge in the second case

disregarded her mental illnesses as a mitigating factor, despite clear evidence of their
impact on her. The abuse of discretion is evident when that sentence is compared with
the first case, where the judge actually mitigated Ms. Quintana's sentence because of
the role those illnesses played in her actions. Beyond that, Ms. Quintana contends that

1

neither judge sufficiently considered several other mitigating factors also present in her
case.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court deprived Ms. Quintana of due process,
equal protection, and effective assistance of appellate counsel when it denied her
motion to augment the record with documents explicitly considered by the second
district court judge.

As such, she respectfully requests that appellate counsel be

provided with access to the requested document and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the first case, Supreme Court Docket Number 39049, Ada County Case
No. CR-FE-10-6046 (hereinafter, case number 39049),1 Ms. Quintana was charged with
one count of grand theft and two counts of grand theft by unauthorized control.
(39049 R., p.5l In exchange for Ms. Quintana's guilty plea to Count I (grand theft), the
State agreed to dismiss the two charges of grand theft by unauthorized control.
(39049 R., p.53.) After Ms. Quintana entered her guilty plea to Count I, the district court
decided to request a copy of the presentence report prepared in Supreme Court Docket
Number 39156, Ada County Case Number CR-FE-1 0-21005 (hereinafter, case number
39156), and also determined that there was no need to supplement that report with
additional evaluations.

(39049 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-9.)

However, that district court was

informed that "Judge Copsey requested additional documentation [in case number

1 The two cases proceeded simultaneously. This is designated as the first case
because, chronologically, it was the first case in which a sentence was imposed.
2 As there are two separate records and two separate transcripts, each is identified by
reference to the corresponding Supreme Court Docket Number.
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39156] concerning Ms. Quintana and reset sentencing to August 03, 2011 [,] for that
purpose.

Upon completion, that information will [be] provided to this Court and

Attorneys in this matter." (39049 Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),
p.3.)3 The prosecutor noted that there was one difference between the PSis, in that the
police reports relating to case number 39049 had been attached to the PSI provided to
the district court in that case. (39049 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20.)
In case number 39049, the district court reviewed the PSI and concluded: "It is
clear that there are psychological factors involved with regard to this defendant. ... But
it is clear to this court that this defendant needs structured programs .... " (39049
Tr., p.45, Ls.16-25.) In consideration of the role those psychological factors played in
regard to Ms. Quintana's actions, the district court imposed her sentence, but informed
her: "I will tell you but for these [psychological] reports it would probably be a five year
sentence, but I'm going to impose a three-year fixed sentence with an eleven-year
indeterminate sentence." (39049 Tr., p.46, Ls.3-7; 39049 R., pp.53-55.) Ms. Quintana
did not file a motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to I.C.R. Rule 35 (hereinafter,
Rule 35) in case number 39049. She did, however, timely appeal from the judgment.
(39049 R., p.60.)

3 As with the transcripts and records, the two PSis are identified by reference to the
corresponding Supreme Court Docket Number. 39049 PSI page numbers correspond
with the page numbers of the electronic file "QuintanaPSl.pdf." 39156 PSI page
numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file "39156
State v. Quintana PSl.pdf." Included in these files are the PSI report as well as all the
documents attached thereto (for example, police reports and addendums to the PSI).
Although the two electronic files are not identical, differing in length and document
order, the transcript indicates that both district courts used the same PSI. (39049
Tr., p.23, Ls.1-13 ("Following the plea it was indicated to the court that Judge Copsey
ordered a presentence report in another case, and the parties agreed that the court
could make use of that presentence report in the sentencing in this case. I have now
received those materials .... I authorized counsel to file any supplemental materials
which they felt might be appropriate. No supplemental materials have been filed .... ").)
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In case number 39156, Ms. Quintana was charged with six counts of burglary, six
counts of grand theft, and six counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property.
(39156 R., pp.62-63.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Ms. Quintana pled guilty to one
count of burglary and two counts of grand theft by possession of stolen property, and, in
exchange, the State dismissed the remaining fifteen charges. (39156 R., p.111.) Upon
reviewing the same PSI as the district court in case number 39049, the district court in
case 39156 concluded: "This is not a mental health issue. This is someone who is
trying to avoid the consequences."

(39156 Tr., p.45, Ls.22-24.)

This district court

dismissed Ms. Quintana's diagnosed mental illnesses as not worth consideration
because "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would say half the population at this point is
bipolar, so -- [sic]," and, "you don't tell [the psychological evaluators] the full extent of
your criminal activity prior to this. And so as a result, they -- they decide that what this
was instead was bipolar disorder." (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls. 2-4, p.46, Ls.10-14.) It also
mentioned that "[t]he prison never even reviews any of the mental health records that
are provided in the presentence report."

(39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.)

It further

disparaged the value of the provided evaluations because "the psychologist at that time 4
having given Miss Quintana a series of tests -- and I'd just note that most of the
assessments that she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that
you do when you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39,
L.2; see also 39156 PSI, pp.41-48 (the evaluation to which the district court referred).)
After dismissing the information contained in the psychological evaluations, this district

This refers to the evaluation performed on Ms. Quintana when she was seventeen.
(39156 Tr., p.38, L.15-23.) Ms. Quintana was twenty-three at the time of sentencing.
(39156 Tr., p.36, L.7.)

4

4

court proceeded to impose Ms. Quintana's sentence based on its own determination of
Ms. Quintana's psychological impulses.
Rather than consider the diagnoses articulated in the psychological reports, the
district court in case number 39156 determined that Ms. Quintana was simply trying to
avoid consequences for her actions.

(39156 Tr., p.41, Ls.19-20, p.42, L.13, p.45,

Ls.22-24.) It also decided that Ms. Quintana had victimized her co-defendant, Shantel
King, because it had also read Ms. King's PSI. 5 (39156 Tr., p.40, Ls.6-9.) As a result, it
imposed a ten-year unified sentence, with four years fixed, on Ms. Quintana for Count I
(burglary), a fourteen-year unified sentence, with four years fixed, for Count VI (grand
theft by possession), concurrent with Count I, and a unified sentence of fourteen years,
with four years fixed, for Count VII (grand theft by possession), consecutive with Counts
I and VI.

(39156 Tr., p.47, L.16 - p.48, L.11.)

In the aggregate, Ms. Quintana's

sentence in case number 39156 was twenty years, with eight years fixed, concurrent
with the sentence imposed in case number 39049. (39156 Tr., p.48, Ls.11-14; 39156
R., pp.111-14.)

Ms. Quintana filed a motion for reconsideration of her sentence pursuant to
Rule 35 in case number 39156 and requested leave to supplement the motion.
(39156 R., p.121.)

She subsequently filed two addenda to her motion.

(39156

R., pp.124, 130.) They contained numerous letters of support from friends and family
members. 6 (39156 R., pp.125-29, 133-36.) They all expressed their continuing support

Ms. Quintana requested that this document be augmented to the record. (Motion to
Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, filed
March 7, 2012.) That request was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court. (Order
Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, April 4, 2012.)
6 The letters submitted with the first addendum were also presented to the district court
at sentencing, and the district court did, in fact, consider them at that time. (39156
R., p.138.)
5

5

for Ms. Quintana. For instance, several of the authors offered to do what they could to
help her rehabilitate. (See 39156 R., pp.125-29, 131-36.) Several also explained the
extent to which Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, as well as the prescribed medication,
affect her. (See 39156 R., pp.125-29.) Ms. Quintana also wrote a letter to the district
court, explaining that she had already completed all the classes available to her, but
that she was taking advantage of what programs she could.

(39156 R., pp.131-32.)

She also expressed her remorse, and pleaded for leniency.

(39156 R., pp.131-32.)

A letter from an unidentified friend also talked about Ms. Quintana's efforts to get what
programming was available through the prison. 7 (R., p.135.)
The district court, however, denied the Rule 35 motion. (39156 R., p.140.) In
doing so, it claimed it had considered Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, but provided no
further discussion regarding their impact on its decision. (See 39156 R., pp.137-140.)
Instead, the district court focused on Ms. Quintana's criminal record, the nature of the
offenses, and an incident where Ms. Quintana had informed the prison staff that she
was suffering complications to a high-risk pregnancy, which later was discovered to be
a fabrication.

(R., pp.139-140.) Ms. Quintana timely appealed from the judgment in

case number 39156. (39156 R., p.117.)
Since the sentences were both based on the same information, contained in the
PSI originally ordered in case number 39156, the arguments on appeal were going to

This letter evidently continued on subsequent pages, but the additional pages were
not included in the record. (See 39156 R., 135.) Ms. Quintana attempted to locate the
remainder of that document and augment the record, but was unsuccessful. (See, e.g.,
Motion to Augment and Suspend Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof,
filed March 7, 2012; Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, April 4, 2012.)
7
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be the same, and so Ms. Quintana moved that the two cases be consolidated on
appeal. That motion was granted.
Ms. Quintana presented evidence to both district courts regarding several
mitigating factors present in her case.

First, Ms. Quintana reported being diagnosed

with several mental health conditions, including bipolar disorder and chronic depression,
at age thirteen.

In addition, the Mesilla Valley Hospital staff diagnosed her with

oppositional defiant disorder, depression, post traumatic stress disorder (hereinafter,
PTSD), and polysubstance abuse.

(39156 PSI, pp.16.)

According to her adoptive

mother, these issues began to present themselves after Ms. Quintana reported that she
was raped when she was twelve.

(39156 PSI, pp. 9-10.) The Idaho Department of

Health & Welfare reconfirmed her bipolar diagnosis in 2011, classifying it as bipolar
disorder type I with psychotic features. 8 Her family and friends reported to the district
court in case number 39156, pursuant to Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion, that when she
takes her medications, she is a valued and contributing member to society.
R., pp.125, 126, 12B.)

(39156

However, these medications also had significant side effects,

which would have notable impact Ms. Quintana. (39156 R., pp.125, 12B.) In fact, those
side effects caused her to stop taking those medications. (39156 R., p.12B.) When she
is not on her medications, Ms. Quintana lacks good judgment and is more susceptible to
influence from her friends. (39156 R., p.125.)

Bipolar disorder type I is the more severe variety of bipolar disorder, in which mood
swings between mania and depression constitute drastic variations from normal
behavior. National Institute of Mental Health, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services,
"Bipolar Disorder," pp.4-5 (200B), http://mentalhealth.gov/health/publications/bipolardisorder/nimh-bipolar-adults.pdf. These episodes are more drastic and longer in
duration than those experienced in patients with bipolar disorder type II. Id. They
may also lead to the need for immediate hospitalization. Id.
8
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In regard to the incident with the alleged pregnancy, Ms. Quintana reported to the
prison medical staff that she was experiencing vomiting and vaginal bleeding, which
caused her to fear for the success of her pregnancy. (39156 PSI, p.87.) Accordingly,
she was experiencing considerable emotional distress. (39156 PSI, p.87.) She based
her belief that she was pregnant on a positive home pregnancy test following an
incident of domestic battery at the hands of a former spouse. (39156 PSI, p.53.) To
support her claim, she presented a letter, supposedly from a doctor in New Mexico,
which purported to confirm the pregnancy. (39156 PSI, p.87.) Upon examination by
medical personnel, however, it was determined that Ms. Quintana was not pregnant, nor
had she recently been pregnant.

(39156 PSI, p.87.)

When confronted about the

matter, Ms. Quintana admitted to forging the letter from the doctor. (39156 PSI, p.53.)
On the other hand, Ms. Quintana also accepted responsibility for her actions and
agreed to pay restitution for the losses associated with all the charges, not just those to
which she pled guilty. (39156 Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, L.7.) The restitution for all those
charges totaled $11,430.94, a sum for which Ms. Quintana is jointly and severally liable
with her co-defendant. (39156 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.7.)
Ms. Quintana's appeals challenge both district court judges' consideration of
these factors as they imposed her sentences. Her appeal in case number 39156 also
challenges the district court's denial of her Rule 35 motion because it failed to
sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the new evidence
she presented.

8

ISSUES
1. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it
imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with eight years fixed, upon
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to burglary and grand theft by
possession of stolen property.
2. Whether the district court in case number 39156 abused its discretion when it
denied Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 motion in light of the new evidence she
presented.
3. Whether the district court in case number 39049 abused its discretion when it
imposed a unified sentence of fourteen years, with three years fixed, upon
Ms. Quintana following her plea of guilty to grand theft?
4. Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Ms. Quintana due process and equal
protection when it denied her Motion to Augment with Ms. King's PSI in light of
the district court's express consideration of that information

9

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed
An Aggregate Sentence Of Twenty Years, With Eight Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Burglary And Grand Theft By Possession Of
Stolen Property

A.

Introduction
The district court in case number 39156 insufficiently considered several

mitigating factors present in Ms. Quintana's case.

The most notable of these was

Ms. Quintana's mental health issues, which this district court declared to be a nonissue, despite the fact that the district court in case number 39049 had already
sufficiently considered that same factor and, based on the same information, actually
reduced Ms. Quintana's sentence because of the role her mental health issues played
in her actions.

By insufficiently considering this and the other mitigating factors, the

district court in case number 39156 insufficiently considered Idaho's recognized
sentencing objectives, and so imposed an excessive sentence in an abuse of its
discretion.

B.

The District Court In Case Number 39156 Did Not Sufficiently Consider
Ms. Quintana's Diagnosed Mental Health Issues
Ms. Quintana asserts that, given any view of the facts, the individual sentences,

as well as the aggregate sentence in case number 39156 of twenty years, with eight
years fixed, are excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of
the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho
771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982).
10

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Ms. Quintana does not allege that
her sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse
of discretion, she must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence is
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or sentencing
objectives, are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

Id.

The protection of society is the primary objective the court should

consider. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that
protects society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered
reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because
the protection of society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result,
each must be addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that the appellate court should consider to determine
whether the objectives are served by a particular sentence.
Idaho 318, 320 (2006).

They include, but are not limited to:

State v. Knighton, 143
"the defendant's good

character, status as a first-time offender, sincere expressions of remorse and
amenability to treatment, and support of family."

Id.

Insufficient consideration of

these factors has been the basis for a more lenient sentence in several cases. See,
e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho
204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593,
11

595 (1982).

In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently

considered by the court as it crafted Ms. Quintana's sentence, and, as a result, the
sentence does not serve the sentencing objectives, and is excessive.
First, the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that I.C. § 19-2523 not only
suggests, but requires, the trial court to consider a defendant's mental illness as a
sentencing factor. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,581 (1999). Ms. Quintana had been
treated for depression and bipolar disorder for several years. (39156 Tr., p.12, L.22 p.13, L.2.) She has also been diagnosed with oppositional defiant disorder, depression,
PTSD, and polysubstance abuse. (39156 PSI, p.16.) The Idaho Department of Health

& Welfare reconfirmed the diagnosis of bipolar disorder type one with severe psychotic
features in 2011. (39156 PSI, pp.16, 115.) According to her adoptive mother, these
conditions began to manifest after Ms. Quintana reported that she was raped. (39156
PSI, p.9.)
These issues may have even presented themselves during Ms. Quintana's
incarceration.

For example, she reported to the prison medical clinic complaining of

complications to an ongoing pregnancy and was experiencing considerable emotional
distress as a result. (39156 PSI, p.87.) And while medical personnel found no physical
evidence of an ongoing or recent pregnancy (39156 PSI, p.87), and Ms. Quintana
admitted forging the doctor's note which supported her claim (39156 PSI, p.53), the
emotional issues underlying such actions speak to the nature of Ms. Quintana's
emotional disorders. Furthermore, the district court in case number 39156 pointed out
that during this same time, Ms. Quintana was seen on video "having a great old time."
(39156 Tr., p.44, Ls.15-16.) Bipolar disorder is defined as the diversion from emotional
norms between mania and depression, and such an oscillation between the two
12

extremes would be consistent with that condition. See n.8, supra (explaining that these
different mood episodes, which may include symptoms of both a manic and depressive
episode, are part of the effects of bipolar disorder).)
The district court in case number 39156, however, dismissed this mitigating
factor out of hand. For instance, it declared that "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would
say half the population at this point is bipolar, so -- [sic]." (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls.3-4.) The
district court went on: "I don't think this is a mental health issue. I don't think treatment
is an issue here." (39156 Tr., p.38, Ls.19-21.) Besides the fact that the district court is
presumably ill-equipped to offer its own opinions as to matters that are within the ken of
trained medical professionals, the error in the district court's assertions in this regard is
made clear when its analysis is compared with the other discussion of these same
issues, based on the same information, in case number 39049. The district court in
case number 39049 took the time to review the statutory factors and the record in this
regard. (39049 Tr., ppAO-45.) Upon doing so, it concluded: "It is clear that there are
psychological factors involved with regard to this defendant .... it is clear to this court
that this defendant needs structured programs." (39049 Tr., pA5, LS.16-18, 23-25.) As
a result, it recommended Ms. Quintana's participation in the therapeutic community, as
well as in any other programs that the prison staff deemed necessary. (39049 Tr., pA7,
Ls.7-13.)
The most telling aspect of that district court's consideration of Ms. Quintana's
mental health issues in case number 39049, however, came during its imposition of
sentence: "Ms. Quintana, I will tell you but for these [psychological] reports it would
probably be a five-year sentence, but I'm going to impose a three-year fixed sentence
with an eleven-year indeterminate sentence." (39049 Tr., pA6, Ls.3-7.) This sentence
13

recognizes the role Ms. Quintana's mental health issues played in her actions,
considers the impact they will play going forward, provides opportunities for her to
address them while in custody, and mitigates the sentence accordingly.9
Instead of engaging in a similar, sufficient consideration of this factor, the district
court in case number 39156 dismissed Ms. Quintana's mental health issues as a factor
entirely.

(See, e.g., 39156 Tr., p.38, Ls.19-21.)

Among its rationales for doing so

was that "the psychologist at that time [when Ms. Quintana was 17] having given
Miss Quintana a series of tests -- and I'd just note that most of the assessments that
she -- that we had here, they don't really do the in-depth testing that you would do when
you have a full psychological evaluation." (39156 Tr., p.38, L.22 - p.39, L.2; see also
39156 PSI, pp.41-48 (report to which the district court referred).)

The district court

continued, "while she's bipolar, we have -- I would say half the population at this point is
bipolar, so -- [sic]," and, "you don't tell [the psychological evaluators] the full extent of
your criminal activity prior to this. And so as a result, they -- they decide that what this
was instead was bipolar disorder."l0 (39156 Tr., p.35, Ls. 2-4, p.46, Ls.10-14.) The
district court actually went so far as to state, "I'll note for the record that the prison will

9 As the district court in case number 39049 recognized, it could still impose a long
indeterminate term as part of the sentence, which addresses the other sentencing
objectives.
(See Tr., p.46, 7-10.)
However, that sentence correctly considers
Ms. Quintana's mental health issues and provides her with a rehabilitative opportunity,
as well as the opportunity to demonstrate her progress when she is potentially released
on parole. This, therefore, demonstrates what a proper consideration of such a factor
should be, and by comparison, illustrates how the district court in case number 39156
failed to sufficiently consider this factor, thus abusing its discretion.
10 The district court appears to have concluded that the two conditions are mutually
exclusive (i.e., if a person has a criminal character, she cannot also suffer from bipolar
disorder), despite the fact that bipolar disorder "causes unusual shifts in mood, energy,
activity levels, and the ability to carry out day-to-day tasks," not that it causes criminal
propensities. See n.8, supra. As such, its factual determination that the psychologists
would misdiagnose Ms. Quintana with bipolar disorder instead of a criminal character is
clearly erroneous.
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do additional testing. The prison never even reviews any of the mental health records
that are provided in the presentence report.,,11

(39156 Tr., p.46, Ls.15-19.)

Having

disparaged the value of these evaluations, the district court proceeded to sentence
Ms. Quintana based on its own determinations of her psychological motivations.
Its primary conclusion was that "nobody is making her accountable. There are
no consequences for this kind of behavior." (39156 Tr., p.39, Ls.15-17, p.41, Ls.19-20.)
Based on its independent determination in this regard, the district court in case number
39156 concluded that "[t]his is not a mental health issue. This is someone who is trying
to avoid the consequences .... Because if you look through here there is a -- there is a
pattern of stealing, thievery from other people and yet virtually no consequence for that."
(39156 Tr., p.45, L.22 - p.46, L.4.) This conclusion was made despite the fact that the
district court in case number 39049 had just imposed a significant sentence as a
consequence to a similar charge (grand theft), and that judge had properly considered
Ms. Quintana's mental health conditions in doing so.

(39049 Tr., p.46, Ls.3-7.)

The district court in case number 39156 did not even make recommendations for
Ms. Quintana to participate in available treatment programs to address her mental
health issues while she is imprisoned, as the district court in case number 39049 did.
(Compare 39156 Tr., p.46, L.21 - p.50, L.3 with 39049 Tr., p.47, Ls.7-13.)

Therefore, this record is replete with evidence of the district court's insufficient
consideration of Ms. Quintana's mental health condition in case number 39156. As it is

11 Apart from the interesting perspective that the prison staff would not review such
records, even if they do perform their own evaluations, this observation does not
provide any reason for the district court to discount the information in the evaluations
contained with the presentence report, especially since I.C. § 19-2523 requires the
district court to consider such information. See I.C. § 19-2523; HoI/on, 132 Idaho
at 581. In addition, as there is no evidence in the record which supports the district
court's assertions in this regard, any finding of fact to that end is clearly erroneous.
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required to consider this factor, the failure to do so should alone cause this Court to
vacate that sentence and remand for new sentencing.

C.

In Addition To Insufficiently Considering Ms. Quintana's Mental Health Condition,
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Also Insufficiently Considered Several
Other Mitigating Factors When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence
Besides her mental health issues, there were several other mitigating factors in

Ms. Quintana's case that the district court failed to sufficiently consider. The first was
the fact that Ms. Quintana experienced a traumatic childhood. See State v. Williamson,
135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001). In Williamson, the Court of Appeals considered the
defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a precursor to the abuse of various
narcotic substances and the impact that played on the offense. Id. Ms. Quintana also
suffered trauma in her childhood, reporting that she had been raped when she was
twelve years old. (39156 PSI, p.9.) The significance of this event is magnified because,
according to Ms. Quintana's adoptive mother, it was only after that event that
Ms. Quintana began lying and engaging in other inappropriate activities, as well as
manifesting symptoms of her mental illnesses.

(39156 PSI, p.10.)

This means

that, even under the district court's skewed perspective of Ms. Quintana's mental health
condition in case number 39156 (all her actions are a product of lying and other
negative behavior that were never accompanied by sufficient consequences), the rape
was the precursor to Ms. Quintana's crimes and thus had an impact on the offense.
Compare Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620. Therefore, this factor needed to be considered

in mitigation. This district court, however, did not discuss it at all. (39156 Tr., pp.37-50.)
This reveals its insufficient consideration of the factors in this case, and thus, its abuse
of discretion.
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Additionally,

Ms.

Quintana

regardless of her prior record.

possesses several

redeeming

characteristics,

Even the habitual criminal will not be subjected to

excessive sentences. See Carrasco, 114 Idaho 354-55. For example, Ms. Quintana
accepted responsibility for her actions and agreed to pay restitution for the losses
alleged in all the charges, not just the ones to which she pled guilty, which totaled
$11,430.94. 12 (39156 Tr., p.20, L.19 - p.21, L.7.) The willingness to pay restitution,
in particular, is another factor the district courts should consider in mitigation.
State v. Richard Hall,

114

Idaho

887,

889

(Ct.

App.

1988).

Furthermore,

acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of responsibility, by the defendant are critical
first steps toward rehabilitation. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010),
rev. denied.

By making these acknowledgements, evidenced by her willingness to

repay all the victims, Ms. Quintana demonstrated that she has taken these critical first
steps.
In addition, she had been pursuing advanced education and was slated to
graduate from the Toni and Guy Hairdressing Academy's cosmetology course in
November 2010. (39156 Tr., p.17, Ls.6-8; 39156 PSI, p.14.) Finally, Ms. Quintana has
the ongoing support of her adoptive family.

(39156 PSI, p.9; 39156 R., pp.133-34.)

Family constitutes an important part of a support network, which can help in
rehabilitation.

See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to

affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support offered in
consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). Therefore, since

12 Ms. Quintana is jointly and severally liable for this amount with her co-defendant in
these cases. (39156 Tr., p.21, Ls.3-4.)
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she has such a support network, she would be more likely to be successful in
community-based rehabilitation programs, were she timely afforded the opportunity to
participate in such programs.
Furthermore, the decision to make some of the sentences consecutive to one
another so that the total term extends beyond the maximum length permitted for any
one of the charges,13 given the mitigating factors present in this case, also constitutes
an abuse of discretion.

When reviewing consecutive sentences, the appellate court

should consider the total aggregate sentence as well as the fixed sentences.

See Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; State v. Ross, 92 Idaho 709, 718 (1968), disapproved of
on other grounds by State v. Claudette Half, 95 Idaho 110, 113 (1972). In Alberts, the
Court of Appeals specifically considered the fact that Mr. Alberts should have been able
to take advantage of the treatment opportunities available to him in prison with a shorter
sentence. Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; see also State v. Dunnagan, 101 Idaho 125, 126
(1980) (recognizing the same).

Similarly, as the district court in case number 39049

implied, Ms. Quintana should be able to receive effective rehabilitative opportunities
during a three-year fixed term sentence. (See 39049 Tr., p.46, L.2-10.) Therefore, the
district court's decision to impose a twenty-year aggregate sentence, and especially, an
eight-year fixed term, in case number 39156 by running some of the sentences
consecutive to one another caused Ms. Quintana's sentence to be excessive, just as
the sentence in Alberts was excessive.

13 The maximum sentence length for burglary is ten years. I.C. § 18-1403. The
maximum sentence length for grand theft as Ms. Quintana committed it (see 39156 R.,
pp. 75-76; compare I.C. § 18-2407(1)) is fourteen years, with a mandatory minimum
prison sentence of one year. I.C. 18-2408(2)(a). Ms. Quintana's aggregate sentence
was for a unified term of twenty years, with eight years fixed. (39156 Tr., p.48, 11-14.)
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A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that a more lenient sentence,
one aimed at rehabilitation, also addresses all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court retains jurisdiction, it still imposes and executes a sentence. 14
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how
even a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and
how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives).

Such a sentence

punishes Ms. Quintana by depriving her not only of her liberty during her period of
retained jurisdiction, but several of her rights (such as the right to possess a firearm) as
well, since this is a felony offense. These results, along with the imposed sentence,
also serve as a deterrent to society at large. See id.

Furthermore, it deters

Ms. Quintana specifically because the sentence need not be suspended should she
perform poorly or otherwise violate the terms of the rider. Even if she completes the
rider and is placed on probation, the looming sentence still deters her from violating her
probation.

Defense counsel in case number 39049 recommended the district court retain
jurisdiction and permit Ms. Quintana to participate in the rider program. (39049
Tr., p.37, L.24 - p.38, L.8.) Counsel in case number 39156 did not make any specific
sentencing recommendations, but did note that the Therapeutic Community program
In this instance, having a
should be recommended.
(Tr., p.36, Ls.1-4.)
recommendation for participation in that rehabilitative program would likely increase her
chances of actually receiving that treatment. Therefore, as rehabilitation, one of the
recognized sentencing objectives needs to be sufficiently, the district court's decision in
case number 39156 to not make that recommendation (and thus insufficiently consider
that objective) constitutes an abuse of discretion.
14
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In this case, the district court does not lose anything in terms of protection of
society, deterrence, or punishment by retaining jurisdiction. Society receives the same
protection by retaining jurisdiction as it does by incarcerating Ms. Quintana. She is in
the custody of the Department of Corrections either way.

She cannot harm society

during that period, so society is protected whether she is on a rider or in prison.
Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to relinquish jurisdiction and leave
Ms. Quintana incarcerated for the entire fixed term of the sentence if she does not show
progress. And if the district court does that, the Parole Board has broad discretion over
whether to release her on parole during the indeterminate term of her sentence.
See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005). However, the district court could
relinquish jurisdiction and enforce the prison sentence knowing that all the sentencing
objectives were properly addressed.
What the rider does provide that a term sentence does not is the opportunity to
rehabilitate. As the Idaho Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation for young offenders,
like Ms. Quintana, is more likely now than in the future. See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho
394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228
(1971).
objective.

Timing of rehabilitation is an important consideration when addressing that
See id; State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489;

State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, the time to employ
such an alternative is now.
The district court in case number 39156, did not even recommend that
Ms. Quintana participate in any rehabilitative programs during her imprisonment.
(Compare 39156 Tr., pp.37-50 with 39049 Tr., pA7, Ls.7-13.) In so doing, the district
court in case number 39156 deprived Ms. Quintana of the opportunity to engage in
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timely rehabilitation, and thus of effective rehabilitation. As a result, this sentence does
not serve the sentencing objectives, notably rehabilitation and protection of society, and
is thus excessive and otherwise represents an abuse of discretion. This Court should
remedy that abuse.

II.
The District Court In Case Number 39156 Abused Its Discretion When It Denied
Ms. Quintana's Rule 35 Motion In Light Of The New Evidence She Presented
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence pursuant to Rule 35 is addressed
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and is essentially a plea for leniency
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).

When petitioning for a sentence

reduction pursuant to Rule 35, the defendant must show her sentence is excessive in
light of new or additional information presented to the sentencing court. Id. "The criteria
for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those applied in
determining whether the original sentence was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors as they were
altered by the new evidence Ms. Quintana presented. See id.; Huffman, 144 Idaho at
203. A failure to do so should result in a more lenient sentence. See Cook, 145 Idaho
at 489-90; Alberts, 121 Idaho at 209; Carrasco, 114 Idaho at 354-55; Shideler, 103
Idaho at 595.
Ms. Quintana presented the district court with several letters discussing her
positive character traits and her struggles with her mental conditions.

(39156

R., pp.125-29, 131-36.) Regarding Ms. Quintana's mental conditions, her family and
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friends reported that when she takes her medications, she is a valued and contributing
member to society.

(39156 R., pp.125, 126, 128.) However, these medications also

have significant side effects which negatively impact Ms. Quintana.

(39156

R., pp.125, 128.) Those side effects have caused her to stop taking those medications.
(39156 R., p.128.) When she is not on her medication, she lacks good judgment and is
more susceptible to influence from her friends.

(39156 R., p.125.)

Several of the

authors of these letters also expressed their continuing support for Ms. Quintana,
offering to do what they could to help her rehabilitate.

(See 39156 R., pp.125-29,

131-36.) Ms. Quintana also wrote the district court a letter, expressing her remorse for
her actions and explaining her dedication to rehabilitation while in prison. For example,
she informed the district court that she had earned her GED and was now participating
in the only programs available to her -

Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics

Anonymous. (39156 R., p.131.)
The district court, however, denied her motion. (39156 R., p.140.) In doing so, it
claimed it had considered Ms. Quintana's mental illnesses, but provided no further
discussion regarding their impact on its decision. (See 39156 R., pp.137-140.) Instead,
the district court focused on Ms. Quintana's criminal record, the nature of her offenses,
and the incident where Ms. Quintana had informed the prison staff that she was
suffering complications to a high-risk pregnancy, which later was discovered to be a
fabrication.

(R., pp.139-140.) As at the original sentencing, the district court in case

number 39156 did not sufficiently consider, or appreciate, the impact her mental health
condition had on those events.
The letters submitted to the district court as part of the Rule 35 motion reveal the
depth of the impact of Ms. Quintana's mental conditions.
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First, they reaffirm the fact

that the conditions began to present when she reached her teen years.

(See, e.g.,

39156 R., p.126.) This was the same time that Ms. Quintana reported her rape (39156
PSI, pp.9-10.), reaffirming the need to sufficiently consider her traumatic childhood as
well.

See Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620.

Second, they reveal the nature of those

conditions, and thus the need for sufficient consideration of her mental health condition.
The district court claimed it considered that factor, but given its aversion to that factor at
the sentencing hearing (see, e.g., 39156 Tr., pA6, Ls.13-14), its single, unsupported,
unreasoned statement claiming that it now had done so is not encouraging. It certainly
did not engage in the detailed and sufficient examination of the aspects of this factor
or the role Ms. Quintana's illnesses played in her actions, unlike its counterpart in
case number 39049.

(Compare 39156 Tr., pA6, LS.13-14 with 39049 Tr., ppAO-45.)

Ms. Quintana's efforts at rehabilitation also reflect a need to reevaluate her amenability
to treatment, which is a factor the district court should consider in mitigation, as it affects
the defendant's potential for effective rehabilitation. See, e.g., Kellis, 148 Idaho at 815.
Because the district court in case number 39156 did not sufficiently consider
the mitigating factors and sentencing objectives in light of this new evidence, which
indicates an increased need to impose a more lenient sentence, one which would afford
Ms. Quintana the opportunity to participate in programs and then be timely paroled, so
that she could apply those lessons in a real-world situation, with the help of her support
network of family and friends, the district court failed to sufficiently consider both the
factors and the sentencing objectives. Therefore, the decision to deny Ms. Quintana's
Rule 35 motion constitutes an abuse of discretion that this Court should remedy.
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III.

The District Court In Case Number 39049 Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A
Unified Sentence Of Fourteen Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Ms. Quintana
Following Her Plea Of Guilty To Grand Theft
While this district court did sufficiently consider Ms. Quintana's mental health
issues, as described in Section (1)(8), supra, it could have imposed a more lenient
sentence based on a sufficient consideration of the other mitigating factors present in
this case, as described in Section (I)(C), supra. 15 (See 39049 Tr., pp.39-48 (wherein
the only mitigating factor the district court discussed was Ms. Quintana's mental health
issues).)

Thus, because of the insufficient consideration of the mitigating factors

besides Ms. Quintana's mental health issues, it imposed an excessive sentence in an
abuse of discretion.

IV.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Ms. Quintana Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied Her Motion To Augment With Ms. King's PSI In Light Of The District
Court's Express Consideration Of That Information

A.

Introduction
80th state and federal precedent recognizes that a defendant is entitled to due

process and equal protection under the law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment of
the federal constitution and Article I, §13 of the Idaho constitution. That precedent also
recognizes that part of due process and equal protection is providing the defendant with
an opportunity to defend herself.

On appeal, this includes providing the defendant,

particularly the indigent defendant, with access to a sufficient record.

The Idaho

Specifically, these are Ms. Quintana's traumatic childhood, her willingness to pay
restitution for all charges, her acceptance of responsibility and acknowledgment of guilt,
her pursuit of advanced education opportunities, and her ongoing familial support.
15

24

Supreme Court's decision to deny Ms. Quintana's request to augment the record in her
case with documents that were clearly considered by the district court in case number
39156 when it imposed her sentence deprived her of that sufficient record, and thus,
deprived her of due process and equal protection under the law.
Furthermore, because Ms. Quintana has a statutory right to her direct appeal,
those constitutional provisions also entitled her to effective assistance of counsel. To
be effective, counsel needs to be able to make a professional evaluation of the
questions that might be presented on appeal or consider all the issues that might affect
the determination in this case. Without access to the requested document, counsel is
unable to fulfill those expectations. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to
deny her motion to augment the record with documents that it clearly considered also
deprived Ms. Quintana of effective assistance of counsel.
Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested document
and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing
raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

B.

By Denying Ms. Quintana's Motion To Augment, The Idaho Supreme Court
Deprived Her Of Due Process And Equal Protection
The Idaho Constitution, as well as the federal Constitution, guarantees the

criminal defendant due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10 CONST., art. I, §13.
Part of that right is the meaningful opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380
U.S. 545, 552 (1965); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998); State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 542, 544
(Ct. App. 2009). And while Idaho maintains independent interpretation of Article I, §13,
it will look to the federal interpretations of due process for guidance in that
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interpretation. State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 128 (2011). As such, Idaho precedent
has interpreted the two sections as coextensive. Id.
In order to provide a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and in order to render a
proper decision in an appellate case, the appellate court needs to "receive and consider
all papers, records, and files presented to the trial court on the hearing of a contested
motion. It would be ... a hazardous endeavor for [the appellate court] to rule upon an
appeal without access to all

relevant material used in the hearing below."

Sheel v. Rinard, 91 Idaho 736, 738 (1967) (emphasis added); I.A.R. Rule 28(c) ("The
clerk's or agency's record shall also include ... statements or affidavits considered by
the court or administrative agency in the trial of the action or proceeding) (emphasis
added); see also Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 837-38 (2008) (recognizing the
defendant has a due process right to review the information considered by the district
court, and the failure to assert that claim constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).
As such, the appellate record needs to include all the information considered by the
district court in case number 39156, which would include those made in Ms. King's PSI.
The district court in case number 39156 explicitly stated that it considered
Ms. King's PSI when it imposed sentence on Ms. Quintana: "We're focusing on victims
in this case. But as part of that, having read Miss King's presentence report and seeing
the interaction, I consider Miss King a victim of Miss Quintana."

(39156 Tr., pAO,

Ls.6-9.) Not only did it rely on the information contained in that PSI report, but it used it
as an aggravating factor in its determination on sentence. Without that document, there
is no way to determine if its use of Ms. King's PSI is another example of the district
court's insufficient consideration of the appropriate sentencing factors in case number
39156.

Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the requested
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document and

should

be allowed the opportunity to provide

any necessary

supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

C.

By Denying Ms. Quintana's Motion To Augment, The Idaho Supreme Court
Deprived Her Of Effective Assistance Of Counsel, And Thus, Of Due Process
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for a right to counsel on appeal for
indigent defendants. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963). Without the
assistance of counsel, the appellate process is reduced to "a meaningless rituaL" Id. at
358. That right inherently demands that such counsel be effective. Evitts v. Lucey, 469
U.S. 387, 397 (1985).
In order to be effective on appeal, counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief on the client's behalf which presents the best
arguments available.

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

The Idaho

Supreme Court has held that the starting point for evaluating the effectiveness of
counsel in criminal actions is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989)

(overruled on other grounds by Card, 121 Idaho at 432.)

Those standards establish

that, to be effective,
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider al/ issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to determine whether there
are issues affecting the validity of the sentence (i.e., indicate that it is excessive),
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counsel needs to consider all the evidence the district court considered, or else, be
ineffective. See id. Without being able to examine Ms. King's PSI, counsel is unable to
consider all the issues which might affect the validity of the sentence or advise
Ms. Quintana on the probable role that information may play in her appeal.
As a result, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Ms. Quintana's Motion
to Augment with Ms. King's PSI deprived her of effective assistance of counsel on her
appeal, and thus, deprived her of due process.

Accordingly, counsel should be

provided with access to the requested document and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Quintana respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that her case, particularly
case number 39156, be remanded to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
Otherwise, she respectfully requests that counsel be provided with access to
Ms. King's PSI and that counsel be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2012.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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